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Abstract: This article examines the links between slavery, the state and society in 
Jamaica between 1754 and 1839, using a new data-set to establish 
levels of taxation and spending between these dates.  It argues that 
these levels were higher than has generally been accepted, both in 
absolute terms and relative to the size of the population and the 
economy, and that fiscal and military state structures were backed up 
by a sophisticated and effective system of public credit (from 1786) 
and paper money (from 1821).  This all enabled the island to make an 
important but underrated contribution to British imperial power in the 
region in this period.  Examining the nature of spending and taxation 
demonstrates, however, that they were accepted by local white elites 
because they went with the grain of ‘creole society’ in the island and 
served their priorities, in particular the management of the enslaved 
population.  This proved effective until the early nineteenth century, 
when the economic burden grew so excessive that planters were unable 
to resist pressures for emancipation, suggesting that even failed slave 
revolts eventually helped to undermine the viability of the slave society 
in the West Indies. 
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In 1754 the Board of Trade noted that the assembly in Jamaica had spent £57,848 or 
more since 1743 on fortifications around the town and harbour of Kingston, ‘[but] the 
whole art of engineering seems to have been employed’, they concluded, ‘in making 
them as expensive as they are defenceless’.1  There were fundamental flaws in one of 
the two forts that guarded the harbour, for example, which was ‘so defenceless a work 
(being very unskilfully designed at first) that it is not worth repairing’.  Governors 
endlessly argued that the planters and merchants were not pulling their weight when it 
came to matters of imperial defence, preferring to abandon both the responsibility and 
the cost to the imperial government.  On the other hand, the Jamaican historian and 
planter Edward Long estimated that in this period the assembly had also spent £7,200 
building barracks for troops, about £1,100 constructing a fortified magazine for arms 
and ammunition, some £38,000 on armed sloops for coastal protection, and £27,000 
subsisting prisoners of war, and well over £180,000 supporting the imperial garrison.2  
Though relatively small by the standards of imperial spending these were nevertheless 
considerable burdens in a population barely one hundredth the size of Britain, though 
because Jamaica’s colonial financial records no longer exist, this has been impossible 
to quantify.  As a result, it has been impossible to assess which side is to be believed. 
 
This article identifies a replacement for these records, the financial data printed by the 
assembly of Jamaica in its journals between 1769 and 1839, and uses these accounts 
to reconstruct the patterns of taxation and expenditure in the island at the height of the 
slave system.  It shows that revenues increased considerably in the late eighteenth 
century from a low base, and that from the 1790s between three and five percent of 
the island’s economic output was collected in taxation.  This was reluctantly tolerated 
by planters and merchants in the island because the taxes were approved by their own 
elected assembly, were initially absorbed by demographic and economic growth, and 
were mainly spent in ways that suited their interests.  ‘The men of property in this 
island pay an ample contribution in order that it may be protected’, wrote Long in 
1774, ‘not so much from the French and Spanish as against the machinations of the 
many thousand slaves, which … grow the more formidable from their multitude’, and 
well over seventy percent of taxes up to the 1830s were spent either on policing the 
enslaved black population or subsidising the plantation sector.3  This process relieved 
the imperial government of a significant part of the cost of its military, commercial 
and humanitarian policies, especially in the 1820s and 1830s, and suggests that the 
island therefore made an important contribution to the projection of imperial power..  
 
-I- 
 
In this period Jamaica was the largest and the most developed island in the British 
West Indies, dominated by a small but cohesive elite of white planters and merchants 
who monopolised political, economic and social power at the expense of the mass of 
the population, who were kept in resentful subordination by brutal violence and the 
practice of social and cultural discrimination.  Captured from Spain in 1655, its 
population rose from virtually nothing to about 87,000 by the 1720s and 180,000 by 
the 1760s, and continued to expand to a peak of about 370,000 in 1808 when the slave 
                                                 
1 National Library of Jamaica, MS 40, Report to the Board of Trade, 1754. 
2 British Library [hereafter BL] Add MS 12435 f. 20v-21r 
3 Edward Long, The History of Jamaica, or, General survey of the antient and modern state of that 
island (3 vols., London, 1774) vol. i, 309-10 
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trade was abolished.4  The bulk of the population were black slaves imported from 
West Africa to work on the sugar and coffee plantations that spread across the island 
from the late seventeenth century.  Its production of sugar, molasses, rum, indigo, 
cotton, coffee, logwood and other tropical commodities rose in proportion.  Sugar 
exports grew from about 670,000 cwt per year in the 1760s to around 1.5 million cwt 
at their peak between 1792 and 1815, while the rise of coffee cultivation and the 
larger trade in slaves and manufactures to Spanish America brought in further riches.  
Jamaica therefore epitomised the economy, society and political system constructed in 
the West Indies during the long eighteenth century. 
 
The island was also the most exposed in the West Indies to danger from without and 
without.  For every white person there were roughly ten slaves, a ratio far higher than 
in most other islands, and the mountainous interior could shelter hostile runaways or 
‘maroons’.5  A series of maroon wars in the 1730s and 1790s, and major slave revolts 
in 1760, 1776 and 1831, caused widespread damage and came close to toppling the 
entire social order.  These may have failed, but the ruinous damage caused by revolts 
in Grenada, Dominica, St Vincent and St Lucia in the 1770s and 1790s, and the utter 
destruction of the French colony of St Domingue after 1791, were stark reminders to 
planters of the dangers of letting down their guard.  They were therefore forced, 
however reluctantly, to take responsibility for their own defence.  ‘It must be granted 
that the maintenance of a standing army in a commercial colony is not the most 
eligible nor oeconomic plan’, Edward Long admitted in 1774, ‘and ought only to be 
admitted in a colony of that class when there is but little hope of settling and peopling 
it extensively’, but like other planters he felt there was no choice.6  The island and its 
shipping was also vulnerable to attack by French and Spanish armies and privateers, 
making it necessary to create a system of external defence able to defeat such efforts. 
 
However, their efforts have not tended to receive much praise.  State formation in the 
1740s was marked by ‘great confusion, inefficiency and above all prodigious waste’, 
noted Richard Pares, ‘which would have been greater still of the assemblies had not 
so much disliked raising taxes’.7  Studies have shown that there were fundamental 
differences of opinion between the metropole and colonial elites concerning imperial 
defence and taxation, to the exasperation of the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office 
                                                 
4 For the development of Jamaica between 1655 and 1775, see Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and slavery: 
an economic history of the British West Indies, 1623-1775 (Barbados, 1974) pp. 123, 208-24; Frank 
Wesley Pitman, The development of the British West Indies: 1700-1763 (London, 1967) pp. 14-38; 
Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and slaves: the rise of the planter class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 
(Chapel Hill, 1972) pp. 149-87 
5 Lowell J. Ragatz, The fall of the planter class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833: a study in social 
and economic history (New York; 1928) pp. 218-27; Michael Craton, Testing the chains: resistance to 
slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, NY, 1982) pp. 67-96, 125-39, 180-223; Andrew Jackson 
O’Shaughnessy, An empire divided: the American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia, 
2000) pp. 34-43.  For the Windward Islands, see above and Elsa V. Goveia, Slave society in the British 
Leeward Islands at the end of the eighteenth century (New Haven, 1965) pp. 251-62, 312-20; Bernard 
Marshall, Slavery, law and society in the British Windward Islands, 1743 - 1823: a comparative study 
(Kingston, Jamaica, 2007) pp. 9-40, 93-9, 208-25.  Craton argues that the revolts in these islands 
prevented them from ever reaching their full economic potential: Craton, Testing the chains pp. 209-10 
6 Long, History vol. ii, 69 
7 Richard Pares, War and trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (London, 1963) p. 241; Ragatz, Fall of 
the planter class pp. 142-5, 164-6; Helen Taft Manning, British colonial government after the 
American Revolution, 1782-1820 (Hamden, CN, 1966) pp. 128, 248-9; D. J. Murray, The West Indies 
and the development of colonial government, 1801-1834 (Oxford, 1965) pp. 4-31, 39-46 
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and individual governors, who were forced to compromise on essential elements in 
imperial policy simply in order to get some of it adopted.  Examining Jamaica and the 
West Indies from the perspective of local elites, Frederick Spurdle, George Metcalf 
and others have confirmed that they could offer very powerful resistance to imperial 
policy and its demands for taxation.8  Most recently, Norman Buckley has concluded 
that, from the perspective of the army, ‘the principal feature of civil-military relations 
[in the West Indies between 1793 and 1815]… was the heightened and persistent 
tension between the demands of military security and the values of a slave society’.9  
Islands such as Jamaica seemed to have been ‘diseased social organism[s]’, in Lowell 
Ragatz’s words, which could not even take responsibility for their own defence.10 
 
More recent work, on the other hand, has stressed the strength and viability of these 
‘creole societies’, in Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s formulation, in which English and 
African political, cultural and social influences were blended by local circumstances 
into a workable norm.11  Christer Petley, Trevor Burnard and others have argued that 
whites in Jamaica were able to create a relatively stable society that controlled slaves 
through efficient political and legal structures, including prisons and workhouses that, 
in Diana Paton’s words, ‘bureaucratized, routinized and rationalized punishment’.12  
Andrew O’Shaughnessy has identified important moments of cooperation, where the 
assembly of Jamaica subsidised the pay of imperial regiments and military auxiliaries, 
built fortifications and barracks, supported local privateers and otherwise helped to 
advance imperial policy in the region.13  Nor is such a colonial ‘fiscal-military’ state 
inherently improbable.  Similar processes were at work in Massachusetts before 1776, 
amounting to a ‘financial revolution’, while Anglo-Protestant elites in Ireland created 
extensive fiscal and military structures that supported their own ends, and those of the 
British imperial state, at the same time.14  ‘As part of that empire and enterprise, 
though not officially a part of that state’, Ivar McGrath concludes, ‘the separate, 
though dependent, kingdom of Ireland played a key, if understated, role’. 
 
 
                                                 
8 George Metcalf, Royal government and political conflict in Jamaica, 1729-1783 (London, 1965), esp. 
pp. 234-7; Frederick G. Spurdle, Early West Indian government: showing the progress of government 
in Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, 1660-1783 (Palmerston North, New Zealand, 1962) 
pp. 33-75, 212.  For Greene, see for example, Jack P. Greene, ‘The Jamaica privilege controversy, 
1764-1766: an episode in the process of constitutional definition in the early modern British empire’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22 (1994) pp. 16-53  
9 Roger N. Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: society and the military in the revolutionary 
age (Gainesville, FL, 1998) p. 200 
10 Ragatz, Fall of the planter class pp. vii-ix; Pitman, West Indies p. 39 
11 Kamau Brathwaite, The development of Creole society in Jamaica, 1770-1820 (Oxford, 1971), esp. 
pp. xiii-xvi, 296-311 
12 Ibid. pp. 21-2, 266-95; Goveia, Slave society pp. 82-94, 152-202, 311-24; Christer Petley, 
Slaveholders in Jamaica: colonial society and culture during the era of abolition (London, 2009) pp. 
35-67; Trevor G. Burnard, Mastery, tyranny, and desire: Thomas Thistlewood and his slaves in the 
Anglo-Jamaican world (Jamaica, 2004) pp. 70-90; Diana Paton, No bond but the law: punishment, 
race, and gender in Jamaican state formation, 1780-1870 (Durham, NC; London, 2004) p. 69 
13 O’Shaughnessy, An empire divided pp. 43-57, 185-200 
14 Charles McGrath, Ireland and empire, 1692-1770 (London, 2012), quotation on p. 2; Patrick Walsh, 
‘The fiscal state in Ireland, 1691-1769’, Historical Journal, 56 (2013) pp. 629-56; William Pencak, 
‘Warfare and political change in mid-eighteenth century Massachusetts’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 8 (1980) pp. 51-73; Julian Gwyn, ‘Financial Revolution in Massachusetts: 
public credit and taxation, 1692-1774’, Histoire Sociale/Social History, 17 (1984) pp. 59-77; Alvin 
Rabushka, Taxation in colonial America (Princeton, 2008) pp. 582-601, 769-79 
‘Jamaican taxation’ 
- 5 - 
It has been impossible so far to judge this for Jamaica, however, because the records 
needed to reconstruct patterns of taxation and spending were almost entirely lost in 
the Kingston earthquake of 1907.  ‘We need to recognise that they once existed … 
[but] very little remains from the business of sustaining a garrison of regular troops’, 
notes James Robertson, in his definitive survey of Jamaican archives.15  Richard 
Sheridan tried to use secondary sources to calculate the economic burden of the state 
on West Indian societies between 1655 and 1775, and concluded that in Jamaica it 
was negligible, but in general the question has largely been ignored.16  This article 
uses the summaries of annual accounts printed in the journals of the assembly in the 
island between 1768 and 1839, the last year of apprenticeship or unfree labour, to 
reconstruct its patterns or political economy of taxation and spending.  The next 
section demonstrates that it was substantial, especially after 1790, but was spent 
almost entirely on maintaining slavery and the plantation system of the island, and 
thus was largely accepted by the planters and merchants who paid it. 
 
-II- 
 
At the heart of the Jamaican fiscal-military state was the assembly, composed of about 
forty planters or merchants, who had the sole right to vote taxation and had by the 
1750s successfully asserted their complete control over collection and disbursement.17  
The governor and council disposed of a permanent revenue of J£8,000 per annum but 
this was increasingly outweighed by the ‘annual funds’ voted by the assembly each 
year, and drawn up by a standing committee of the assembly called the commissioners 
of public accounts.  ‘In all essence’, notes Spurdle, ‘it was the Treasury Board of the 
island’, negotiating with contractors for various civil and military tasks, auditing the 
accounts of the island, and setting out financial and fiscal policy.18  Cash itself was 
received, held and paid out by the island’s receiver-general, who explained to the 
governor in 1832 that ‘the office is one of very great responsibility’, adding that ‘I am 
my own cashier [and] am accountable for all deficiencies’.19  He dealt in turn with 
various imperial and colonial officials concerned with revenue, and with standing 
committees of the assembly such as the commissioners of forts, who were charged 
with the construction and maintenance of barracks and fortifications.20  These were 
the foundations of an increasingly large and intrusive colonial fiscal-military state. 
 
Levels of taxation and spending in Jamaica had been growing since the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, as shown in Figure 1, which is derived from the accounts that 
governors occasionally sent back to the Board of Trade.  Revenues rose from roughly 
                                                 
15 James Robertson, ‘Jamaican archival resources for seventeenth and eighteenth century Atlantic 
history’, Slavery & Abolition, 22 (2001) p. 116 
16 Sheridan, Sugar and slavery pp. 470-4; Robert Thomas, ‘The sugar colonies of the Old Empire: 
profit or loss to Great Britain?’, Economic History Review, 21 (1968) p. 38 
17 Agnes M. Whitson, The constitutional development of Jamaica, 1660 to 1729 (Manchester, 1929), 
esp. pp. 148-67; Metcalf, Royal government pp. 26-9, 44-53, 118-20; Spurdle, Early West Indian 
government pp. 110-3; Brathwaite, Creole society pp. 40-59 
18 Spurdle, Early West Indian government pp. 122, and 116-26.  See also John Lunan, The Jamaica 
magistrate's and vestryman's assistant (St Jago de la Vega, 1828) pp. 268-70.  This publication was 
intended to act as a work of reference for local magistrates and vestreymen, and therefore provides a 
useful guide to the works of central and local government in the 1820s. 
19 The National Archives of the United Kingdon [hereafter TNA], CO 137/183 f. 31r.  For more on the 
receiver-general, see Spurdle, Early West Indian government pp. 122-4; J.H. Parry, ‘Eliphalet Fitch: a 
Yankee trader in Jamaica during the War of Independence’, History, 40 (1955) pp. 84-98 
20 Spurdle, Early West Indian government pp. 127-40; Brathwaite, Creole society pp. 9-15, 26-31 
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J£10,000 a year in Jamaican currency (J£) in the early 1720s to J£50,000 in 1749 and 
J£75,000 in 1761, during the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-48) and the Seven 
Years War (1754-63).21  Expenditure also increased during the First Maroon War in 
the 1730s, as the assembly dispatched colonial and imperial forces into the interior to 
fight the maroons, and Long suggested that revenues had even hit J£100,000 in 1760, 
when the threat of external invasion was supplemented by internal rebellion during 
Tackey’s Revolt.22  Growing levels of taxation were therefore driven primarily by the 
need to respond to domestic threats and foreign invasion, but left an administrative 
residue that gradually ratcheted up overall expenditure.  For example, after 1739 the 
assembly continued to support the subsistence of eight companies of British troops 
garrisoned on the island, and paid the salaries of the four white superintendents 
appointed as ambassadors to the maroon towns in the interior.23  On the other hand, 
the population also rose in this period, from about 90,000 in the 1720s to 180,000 by 
the 1760s, so the actual levels of taxation per head in fact remained relatively constant 
at about J£0.30 per person per year in peacetime and J£0.35 in wartime, and peaked at 
J£0.47 in 1730 and 1761, and J£0.62 in 1760.24  Taxes therefore quadrupled during 
this period, but demographic and economic growth meant it could all be absorbed 
with very little fuss, and required no great innovations from the assembly. 
 
Far more information is available from September 1768, when the assembly began to 
record its yearly budgets or ‘Estimates’ in their journals, which were then reproduced 
when the journals were printed in the early nineteenth century.  These Estimates were 
prepared each year by the commissioners of accounts and passed by the house after 
discussion, and served to assign or hypothecate the taxes raised in separate revenue 
bills to specific purposes over the coming year.  They generally consisted of the main 
or ‘contingent’ spending that the commissioners anticipated, as well as debts due by 
the public of Jamaica to the assembly as arrears of taxation, and the debts due by the 
assembly to the public, which included money loaned by the public and the contingent 
charges of the past year that had not yet been paid off.25  Most Estimates also noted 
the amount or balance or cash in the hands of the receiver-general that September, and 
from the 1790s the assembly also began recording the taxes collected in the past year 
and the ‘ways and means’ or quotas voted for the next year.  The accounts therefore 
required some disaggregation before they can be used, though both Edward Long and 
Bryan Edwards were happy to reproduce the Estimates wholesale in their respective 
works as proof of the burden of taxation.26  They also offer only estimated rather than 
actual levels of spending, and only for the period after the 1768/9 financial year up to 
1838/9, when the assembly revalued its own currency to match the pound sterling. 
 
Even these estimates, however, nevertheless indicate that there was a distinct change 
of pace after 1768.  Average spending quadrupled during the American Revolutionary 
                                                 
21 Craton, Testing the chains pp. 81-101, 125-38; Pares, War and trade pp. 227-32, 239-63; Metcalf, 
Royal government pp. 64-75, 150-5, 177-81.  For this period, £100 sterling was equivalent to J£140. 
22 Long, History vol. i, 68-9 and TNA, CO 137/73, Moore to Board of Trade, 2 Jan. 1761. 
23 Metcalf, Royal government pp. 61-2; Craton, Testing the chains pp. 89-96 
24 Peacetime is taken here as 1734, 1738, 1754 and 1764 and wartime at 1725, 1730, 1746, 1761 and 
1763. 
25 Spurdle, Early West Indian government pp. 110-13, 120-2  
26 Ibid. pp. 119-20.  By failing to separate debts and arrears from contingent spending, they therefore – 
perhaps intentionally – overstated total spending, a mistake repeated in subsequent historiography.  
See, for example, Brathwaite, Creole society pp. 9-10; Spurdle, Early West Indian government, pp. 
120. 
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War (1775-83), especially when natural disasters, domestic unrest and the threat of 
invasion coincided in September 1782, when the assembly voted at least J£240,601 
for the 1782/3 financial year.27  Spending fell back after the war, but was still more 
than double pre-war levels, and doubled again at the start of the French Revolutionary 
War (1791-1802) as St Domingue descended into anarchy.  A brief bust costly war 
against the Maroons from July 1795 to March 1796, and the withdrawal of the British 
forces in St Domingue to the Jamaica garrison in 1798, pushed the Estimates up to at 
least J£420,000 per year until the end of the war, and although spending fell to more 
reasonable levels during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) the need to support a large 
garrison meant that it still averaged about J£240,000 per year.  This only fell slightly 
in peacetime, and even began to rise in the 1820s and 1830s, including a brief spike 
during the slave revolt of December 1831, known as the Baptist War, which pushed 
spending up to about J£565,000.  Expenditure therefore increased enormously in this 
period, most significantly in response to black revolts that threatened the entire basis 
of the slave society and plantation economy in the island. 
 
Building on Patrick O’Brien’s conclusion that examining the patterns of taxation and 
spending within the British state can ‘help to encapsulate its central preoccupation’, 
breaking down estimated spending in Jamaica between 1768 and 1839 into separate 
categories – the military, policing, tax collection, interest charges, loan repayments 
and civil expenditure – confirms that policing and defence were the main components 
of spending up to the 1830s. 28  Until 1833 the assembly subsidised military defence, 
including the costs of provisioning and quartering the imperial garrison – it briefly 
reached 5,000 men in 1800 – and the construction and maintenance of barracks, forts, 
batteries and other military installations.29  As shown in Figure 3, even in peacetime 
these costs accounted for about 45 percent of the Estimates, and in wartime they rose 
to roughly 55 or 60 percent.  The garrison was used more for internal policing than for 
external defence, to the perennial frustration of governors, since the assembly used its 
financial leverage to insist that troops be quartered in small groups around the island 
to help maintain order among slaves, even if this made no strategic sense, reduced 
military discipline, and caused far higher rates of sickness than if the troops had been 
garrisoned in healthier barracks at high elevations.30  Planters were therefore willing 
to vote large sums for troops, when suited their interests, as in Ireland, where the 
Protestant Ascendancy subsidised a huge imperial garrison that was then distributed 
around the island in small contingents to police the Catholic Irish and crush dissent.31  
As noted below, a further three to six percent was spent on collecting revenue, and 
eighty to twelve percent on paying interest and repaying loans, for sums that were 
mainly to be spent on the military and, increasingly, policing.   
 
Military spending fell to only about thirty percent of total spending after 1815, and 
then to nothing at all after the subsidy was abolished in 1833, but the change was 
                                                 
27 Craton, Testing the chains pp. 172-9; Metcalf, Royal government pp. 199-27; O’Shaughnessy, An 
empire divided pp. 167-74. 
28 Patrick K. O’Brien, ‘The political economy of British taxation, 1660-1815’, Economic History 
Review, 41 (1988) pp. 1-32.  Quotation on p. 1. 
29 Pares, War and trade pp. 245-52, 262-3; Manning, British colonial government pp. 217-22, 235-48; 
Buckley, British army pp. 47-88, 128-31, 275-95 
30 Spurdle, Early West Indian government pp. 137-8; Buckley, British army pp. 16-23, 80-2. 
31 R.B. McDowell, Ireland in the age of imperialism and revolution, 1760-1801 (Oxford, 1979) pp. 
568-9; S. J. Connolly, Divided kingdom: Ireland, 1630-1800 (Oxford, 2008) pp. 318-24; McGrath, 
Ireland and empire pp. 83-91, 112-13 
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more apparent than real.  Not only did imperial spending rise to compensate, from 
£110,000 to about £184,000 a year32, but the slack was largely taken up by increased 
expenditure on workhouses, prisons, and a paramilitary police directly modelled on 
the Royal Irish Constabulary, which had been founded in Ireland in 1814 and 1822 to 
address the same challenges of policing a restive and alien population.33  Funds had 
always been voted by the assembly for policing or civil order, such as maintaining 
gaols, constructing roads, paying bounties for recapturing runaway slaves, and 
supporting the white superintendents in the Maroon towns, but this had never been 
more than ten percent of spending before the 1820s and was generally closer to five 
percent, rising from about J£6,900 in the 1770s to about J£24,000 in 1830/1.34  From 
1833/4 and 1838/9, however, it doubled to about J£50,000 per year, and was tolerated 
because it was used to support the constabulary and construct a new range of gaols 
and workhouses intended to control the black population of the island once their term 
of apprenticeship ended in 1838.  Paton has emphasised that these policies reflected a 
dialogue between the assembly, the imperial government and local parishes, ‘[which] 
makes it essential to pay attention to the local processes by which a network of state 
institutions was built’, in which the willingness to vote taxation was a key element.35 
 
More than seventy percent of its budget in any given year before 1834 was therefore 
spent on the military, public order, and the fiscal and financial costs largely associated 
with that.  This was lower than in Britain or Ireland, which both spent up to eighty or 
ninety percent in wartime between 1660 and 1815, but still shows that the central 
preoccupation of the assembly was the protection of the political, social and racial 
order against internal rebellion and, to a somewhat lesser degree, external invasion.  
The balance of spending was taken up by civil expenditure, which expanded from 
about J£11,000 in the 1770s to J£120,000 a year by the time of Emancipation, though 
some of this may include fiscal or military expenditures not captured in the other 
statistics.  Much of this money was allocated for expenditures that likewise served 
almost exclusively the interests of the white elite in the island, such as the 
construction and maintenance of hospitals, schools and other public works, public 
health programmes such as the Kingston Hospital and Vaccine Establishment, judicial 
and clerical stipends, and economic bounties and subsidies.36   
 
This increase in spending also required a corresponding increase in revenue, to which 
the assembly responded with growing sophistication.  This can be tracked from 1789, 
when the assembly began to print accounts of both the revenues collected in the past 
year and estimated receipts for the coming year.  The receiver-general collected five 
                                                 
32 CO 142/44 f. 41v-42r; CO 142/45 f. 28v-29r; CO 142/46 f. 39v-40r; /47 f. 33v-34r.  . 
33 Paton, No bond pp. 53-119, 191-3; William A. Green, British slave emancipation: the sugar colonies 
and the great experiment, 1830-1865 (Oxford, 1976) pp. 164-76, 183-4; Howard Johnson, ‘Patterns of 
policing in the post-emancipation British Caribbean, 1835-95’, in David M. Anderson and Davi 
Killingray, eds., Policing the Empire: government, authority and control, 1830-1940 (Manchester, 
1991) pp. 171-4.  For Ireland, see Connolly, Divided kingdom pp. 324-5; McDowell, Ireland pp. 67-70 
34 Paton, No bond pp. 19-53; Mavis C. Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655-1796: a history of 
resistance, collaboration and betrayal (Granby, MA, 1988) pp. 152-63, 196-204; Lunan, Vestryman's 
Assistant pp. 143-5.  For a comparison, see Roderick A. McDonald, ‘Urban crime and social control in 
St. Vincent during the Apprenticeship’, in Roderick A. McDonald, ed., West Indies accounts: essays on 
the history of the British Caribbean and Atlantic economy in honour of Richard Sheridan (Kingston, 
Jamiaca, 1996) pp. 319-37 
35 Paton, No bond p. 17 
36 Brathwaite, Creole society pp. 268-95 
‘Jamaican taxation’ 
- 9 - 
categories of revenue.  As shown in Figure 4, miscellaneous revenues accounted for 
less than three percent of receipts in this period, while the arrears of taxation generally 
made up ten percent, but more in wartime when taxes increased and the economy was 
disrupted.  A system of public debt made up seventeen percent of spending across this 
period, even in peacetime, when the assembly had to refinance the debt it could not 
afford to pay down, while the surplus of the standing revenue was generally about 
five percent.  The mainstays of public revenues were therefore the direct and indirect 
taxes, which provided almost two thirds of income across this period.  The first were 
levied on land, rents, stock and slaves and, as Table 2 shows, they were heaviest in 
wartime but fell sharply after the end of slavery in 1834.  Indirect taxes included an 
excise on the sale of rum and other liquors, a stamp duty, and a series of fixed and ad 
valorem duties on goods and produce imported into the island from the British Isles, 
the United States and elsewhere, and tended to be more important in peacetime, when 
they made up nearly a third of revenues, compared to nearly two thirds in Britain and 
Ireland.37  Thus, as in Barbados, ‘while English concepts [of taxation] may have been 
imported into the colonies (at various times), they soon developed a life of their own, 
according to local rather than English conditions’.38   
 
Because only estimated rather than actual spending can be tracked before 1826, it is 
not possible to reconstruct here the exact balance of spending, but it seems to have 
kept pace with expenditure until the 1790s.  Despite Edward Long’s prediction that if 
taxes rose beyond J£100,000, as they had done in 1760, ‘it might go near to ruin the 
island’, by 1782/3 the assembly was collecting more than twice that sum, and this 
only increased in the next decade.39  The burden was moderated by demographic and 
economic growth, as noted in the next section, and by a system of public borrowing 
which allowed some of these costs to be spread out over several years, and was also 
accepted by the planters and merchants because unpaid officials were used to collect 
the bulk of the direct and indirect taxes, which held down costs.  Long calculated, for 
example, that it cost less than J£2,500 to collect revenues of more than J£60,000, ‘a 
circumstance very favourable to the planters, on whom the burthen principally rests’, 
and the costs of collecting taxes before 1834 were relatively low, as noted above, and 
about half the cost of the more bureaucratic structures used in Britain and Ireland.40   
 
This pattern of taxation and spending was fundamentally disrupted by Emancipation 
in 1834 and the system of apprenticeship, which lasted until August 1838.  Direct 
taxes fell to about J£23,000 per year or nine percent of revenues in favour of indirect 
taxation, which shifted the burden onto the newly emancipated population in the form 
of higher prices and reduced standards of living.41  The political economy of spending 
also altered.  Beyond the large sums spent on policing, civil spending rose in part to 
support subsidies for immigrant workers and bounties to encourage agriculture, while 
the assembly also began to pour money into courts, gaols, workhouses, churches and 
other measures needed to accommodate and control a free black population.42  Some 
                                                 
37 O’Brien, ‘Political economy’, pp. 8-28; McGrath, Ireland and empire pp. 171-9; Walsh, ‘Fiscal 
state’, pp. 638-40 
38 For taxation before 1768, see Peter Harris, Income tax in common law jurisdictions: From the 
origins to 1820 (Cambridge, 2006) pp. 146-7, 164-5, 215-16, 220-1, 248-50, 267  
39 Bryan Edwards, The history, civil and commercial, of the British colonies in the West Indies (3 vols., 
London, 1793-1801) vol. ii, 278 
40 Long, History vol. ii, 67-8; Walsh, ‘Fiscal state’, pp. 643-4. 
41 Gisela Eisner, Jamaica, 1830-1930: a study in economic growth (Manchester, 1961) pp. 365-9 
42 Green, British slave emancipation pp. 263, 270-2, 284, 309-52; Paton, No bond pp. 53-81 
‘Jamaican taxation’ 
- 10 - 
of these costs were absorbed by the imperial government, especially the compensation 
for former slave-owners, but the wider costs were still borne by the island.  This was 
grudgingly tolerated by elites because these changes in spending and taxation suited 
their immediate interests, relieved them of most of the direct economic burden of 
taxation, and gave them control over these transformative social and economic 
changes.  This therefore represented the culmination of a process of state formation 
that had been in train since the late eighteenth century.   
 
-III- 
 
Between 1768 and the abolition of the slave trade in 1808 the population of Jamaica 
rose from about 200,000 to a peak of 370,000.  It then fell to about 350,000 in the 
1830s under the brutal conditions of slavery.43  The initial rise in taxation therefore 
occurred against a backdrop of demographic growth, which helped to absorb some of 
the costs.  As noted above, taxation was about J£0.30 per person per year in peacetime 
and J£0.35 in wartime before 1768, and although the influx of Loyalist refugees and 
their slaves during the American Revolutionary War moderated some of the rise, 
taxes in 1782 still reached about £0.98 per person.44  This fell back to pre-war levels 
after 1783 as the economy revived and taxation abated, but then matched and even 
exceeded previous wartime levels during the French Revolutionary War, representing 
about J£1.09 per person on average between 1795 and 1802, and peaking at J£1.22 in 
1802/3.  Although taxation then decreased after 1803, to J£0.77 per head during the 
Napoleonic Wars, the fall in the population meant that the overall burden per head 
only fell to J£0.64 after 1815, and even increased slightly in the 1830s, though taxes 
did spike briefly to J£1.17 per head during the Baptist War in December 1831.  Thus, 
although the value of taxation rose by an order of magnitude in this period, the rise in 
population meant that its actual burden was only two to four times as much, though 
planters continued to complain about high taxes, especially as profitability fell. 
 
A more exact measure of the burden of government in Jamaica in this period comes 
from considering taxation as a percentage of the island’s gross domestic product or 
the national income.  Ragatz and Williams suggested that this began to decline after 
1763, which would suggest that the colonial state began to expand at almost the same 
moment its economic foundations were dissolving.45  In fact, the consensus of most 
recent work is that economic growth continued beyond 1763 or even 1783 until 1807, 
as planters expanded sugar and coffee cultivation to fill the gap left by wartime trade 
restrictions and devastation in St Domingue, followed by an extended era of decline 
after 1815.46  Quantifying this, however, has been difficult, since trade statistics are 
                                                 
43 Eisner, Jamaica, 1830-1930 pp. 127-35; Pitman, West Indies pp. 373-8; B.W. Higman, Slave 
population and economy in Jamaica, 1807-1834 (Cambridge, 1976) pp. 45-98 
44 I have chosen to calculate both taxation and national income (see below) on a per capita basis, rather 
than per white capita basis, both for a consistent comparison with other states and because the slaves in 
Jamaica, though denied agency, were arguably still part of the overall productive capacity of the island. 
45 For a historiographical summary, see Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British slavery in the era of 
abolition (Pittsburgh, PA, 1977) pp. xxi-xxvii, 3-10 
46 Ragatz, Fall of the planter class pp. 204-36, 286-330; Drescher, Econocide pp. 39-71; J. R. Ward, 
British West Indian slavery, 1750-1834: the process of amelioration (Oxford, 1988) pp. 38-45; David 
Ryden, West Indian slavery and British abolition, 1783-1807 (Cambridge, 2009) pp. 216-53; Ahmed 
Reid, ‘Sugar, slavery and productivity in Jamaica, 1750-1807’, Slavery & Abolition, 37 (2016) pp. 159-
82.  For earnings from the entrepot trade, see Adrian John Pearce, British trade with Spanish America, 
1763-1808 (Liverpool, 2007) pp. 89-107, 238-49 
‘Jamaican taxation’ 
- 11 - 
incomplete and data on the internal economy of the island are lacking.  The approach 
used here employs contemporary assessments of the volume of trade and total wealth 
or fixed capital of the island at certain moments and translates them into provisional 
figures for national income, using Gisela Eisner’s study of the Jamaican economy in 
1832 find the necessary ratios.47  This approach is not without its problems, can offer 
preliminary figures which suggest that taxation rose from less than one percent of 
national income in 1768 to about three percent after 1791, peaking at five percent in 
moments of crisis, indicating the limits of taxation within the colonial economy. 
 
After the English conquest in 1655 the island enjoyed almost uninterrupted economic 
expansion.  Although temporarily held back by the threat of the Maroons in the 1720s 
and 1730s, the successful conclusion of the First Maroon War in 1739 opened up the 
northern and western parts of the island to full-scale cultivation, bolstered by the trade 
in slaves and British manufactures to Spanish America.48  The governor of the island 
told the Board of Trade in 1754 that the island had exported commodities worth about 
J£1.7 million, collecting only about J£34,000 in revenue, ‘[and] these are the heavy 
and grievous taxes so loudly complained of’.49  Eisner has calculated that in 1832 the 
total or gross exports were only about 44 percent of national income or gross domestic 
product, the remainder consisting of re-exports to Spanish America, the cultivation of 
provisions and livestock for internal consumption, and a small industrial and service 
sector, which suggests that national income in 1754 was about J£3.9 million per year, 
and the burden of taxation less than one percent of that, though they probably doubled 
in wartime as spending increased.50  Twenty years later, the governor estimated that 
exports had risen to J£2.1 million per year, so the national income was J£4.8 million, 
at a point when Trevor Burnard has estimated that the total ‘wealth’ or capital of the 
island was approximately £25.5 million sterling or J£35.7 million.51  This implies in 
turn that the income from capital was about 13.5 percent, rather than the 8.4 percent 
estimated by Richard Sheridan, though Burnard’s calculation that wealth in Jamaica 
1754 was only J£14 million suggests a return of 27.8 percent in that year.52  This may 
mean that the period was indeed one of unbelievable economic activity, or, more 
likely, that the island’s economy was more heavily based on exports than it would be 
in 1832, and that national income was possibly only half as much in 1754 and 1774.   
                                                 
47 Michael Moohr and David Eltis have similarly relied on Eisner’s calculations for their studies of 
Barbados and British Guiana: see David Eltis, ‘The total product of Barbados, 1664-1701’, Journal of 
Economic History 55 (1995) pp. 321-38; Michael Moohr, ‘The economic impact of slave emancipation 
in British Guiana, 1832-1852’, Economic History Review 25 (1972) pp. 588-607. 
48 For the economic situation before 1776, see Trevor G. Burnard, Planters, merchants, and slaves: 
plantation societies in British America, 1650 - 1820 (Chicago, IL, 2015) pp. 61-89, 157-210; Sheridan, 
Sugar and slavery pp. 97-102, 229-32; Ragatz, Fall of the planter class pp. 37-80; Ward, British West 
Indian slavery pp. 80-95, 105-18; Pearce, British trade pp. 26-32, 52-6, 240-9 
49 TNA, CO 137/27 f. 23v-24r. 
50 See Table  
51 William Clements Library, Ann Arbour, MI [hereafter CL], Henry Strachey Papers, Dartmouth 
volume i, 30-9; Trevor G. Burnard, ‘“Prodigious riches”: the wealth of Jamaica before the American 
Revolution’, Economic History Review, 54 (2001) pp. 506-24; idem, Planters, merchants and slaves: 
plantation societies in British America, 1650-1820 (Chicago, 2015) pp. 167-8.  For overall economic 
conditions, see Sheridan, Sugar and slavery pp. 447-66 
52 Sheridan, Sugar and slavery pp. 448-59.  Sheridan’s figures would produce a national income of 
J£1.3 million in 1754, and J£3.0 million in 1774, with exports accounting for nearly seventy percent of 
that, shifting to J£4.8 million and sixty percent in 1787, and J£6.9 million and fifty-five percent in 
1812, compared to Eisner’s figure of forty-four percent in 1832.  In Barbados in 1664-6 and 1699-
1701, the figure was closer to thirty percent: Eltis ‘Total product’ p. 329. 
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Continued economic growth after 1763 allowed the island to absorb, but not wholly 
ignore, increased spending and taxation.  Taxation may have increased to nearly three 
percent of national income after 1776, and five percent in 1782.53  Using statistics for 
1787, Bryan Edwards estimated that the total wealth of the island had risen by nearly 
forty percent since 1774 to J£54.6 million, suggesting a gross domestic product of 
J£7.3 million, and that exports has increased to J£2.8 million, which would imply one 
of £6.4 million, with the real total probably lying somewhere in between.54  Taking 
the average of these figures suggests that taxation rose from J£120,000 per year or 
less than two percent of national income during the peace to J£175,000 or two and a 
half percent up to 1795, but then doubled to J£373,000 or about five percent for the 
rest of the Revolutionary Wars, given the continued expansion in the economy 
between 1787 and 1812.  Using the average of these years suggests that national 
income by 1800 was probably about J£8.9 million per year, indicating that the 
J£373,000 voted on average per year after the Second Maroon War tapped over four 
percent of the economy, peaking at more than five percent again when J£463,000 was 
raised in 1802.  Within the space of thirty years the new and pressing demands of 
warfare had therefore forced the assembly for a few years to increase by five times, in 
economic terms, the burden of taxation.  This was accepted, however reluctantly, as 
the price of social and economic stability.  The examples of St Domingue, Grenada 
and others not doubt suggested that this was price that was ultimately worth paying. 
 
In a survey of the wealth and resources of Britain’s imperial possessions in 1812, 
‘from authentic documents and the best accessible information where no document 
exists’, the political economist and statistician Patrick Colquhoun applied Edwards’ 
valuations to an updated survey of the island to calculate the increase in wealth since 
1787.55  He argued that it had jumped by more than thirty percent to just over J£81.2 
million, despite the recent abolition of the slave trade, suggesting a national income of 
about J£10.9 million per year, though calculations by Ryden, Drescher and Higman 
that exports in the island were worth J£3.9 million per year between 1810 and 1814 
indicates one closer to J£8.9 million.56  Once again, averaging out these two figures 
suggests that national income was probably around J£9.9 million per year, and that 
taxation of about J£300,000 on average was therefore about three percent of national 
income, though it would probably have been higher by half a point if the assembly 
had not borrowed an average of J£35,000 per year during the Napoleonic Wars to 
bridge the gap between taxes and spending.  Continued economic growth therefore 
cushioned the most extreme rises in taxation, enabling the assembly to push the rate 
of spending even higher than before, particularly during the crises between 1795 and 
1802, and to keep it at levels during the Napoleonic War that had only been sustained 
in the past for a few years at a time, such as during the American Revolutionary War. 
 
                                                 
53 O’Shaughnessy, An empire divided pp. 162-7, 196-7; Ragatz, Fall of the planter class pp. 145-72;  
54 Edwards, History vol. i, 242-3.  He put the wealth of the island at £39 million sterling, and exports at 
£2 million. 
55 Patrick Colquhoun, A treatise on the wealth, power, and resources, of the British Empire, in every 
quarter of the world (London, 1814) pp. 344, 378-9, 381 
56 Ibid. p. 379; Higman, Jamaica p. 213; Drescher, Econocide pp. 148-56; Ahmed Reid and David 
Ryden, ‘Sugar, land markets and the Williams thesis: evidence from Jamaica's property sales, 1750-
1810’, Slavery & Abolition, 34 (2013) pp. 401-24.  Colquhoun thought that exports in 1812 were nearly  
double this, and put the national income of the island at an implausible J£16 million per year.   
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However, although the assembly immediately cut back spending hard after 1815 in 
order to enjoy a brief peace dividend, the economic decline as that the island began to 
experience meant that the real burden of taxation did not, in fact, decline much.  The 
national income had fallen by nearly thirty percent by 1832, when Eisner estimates 
that it was about J£7.1 million, and the combined effects of Emancipation in 1834, the 
end of apprenticeship in 1838, and the abolition of protective sugar duties in 1846, 
drove the national income down by 1850 to J£5.2 million per year.57  A constant rate 
of decline between 1812 and 1834 would suggest that national income in the 1820s 
was probably still around J£8.5 million, though Higman’s figures suggest that exports 
remained high, about J£3.6 million between 1825 and 1829, and thus that the decline 
before 1830 was much more modest.  The J£240,000 or so raised per year in this 
period therefore probably still averaged about three percent, and would have been one 
percent higher if the assembly had not, as noted above, relied on borrowing to fund at 
least one fifth of spending.  The Baptist War in December 1831 briefly pushed up the 
level of taxation to J£410,000, far higher than Eisner’s estimates of J£383,000, which 
was probably just under six percent of national income in the 1831/2 financial year, 
though if J£150,000 had not been raised in loans to support spending this might have 
been two percent higher.58  Assuming that the economy remained relatively stable in 
the period of apprenticeship, the J£240,000 raised each year by the assembly was at 
least three or four percent of national income, higher than wartime levels, and would 
likewise have been closer to five percent if the assembly had not saved J£100,000 or 
so a year by abolishing in 1833 the subsidies paid to the imperial garrison. 
 
Although these calculations remain extremely provisional, and require confirmation 
from more detailed studies of the Jamaican economy, they nevertheless suggest that 
the massive rise in taxation in this period was only partially cushioned by economic 
growth, and that planters and merchants were prepared for security to pay three – and 
at times even five – times as much as they had ever done.  These figures were of 
course negligible compared to Britain, where taxation rose from about three or four 
percent of national income before 1688 to more than ten percent for most of the 
eighteenth century, and twenty percent during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars.59  It closely matched levels in Ireland though, where the elite had the same 
problems of facing down a hostile population.  National income in 1776 was about 
£37.5 million in Irish currency and fell to about £35 million by 1800.60  Taxes were 
already at £1.2 million in 1776, about three percent of national income, and in the 
1790s they rose to £3.6 million in response to justified fears of French invasion and 
Catholic Rebellion, or more than ten percent of income.61  The Protestant elite in 
                                                 
57 Eisner, Jamaica, 1830-1930, pp. 25-59, 236-83.  For economic conditions in Jamaica between 1815 
and 1839, see Ragatz, Fall of the planter class pp. 331-83; Green, British slave emancipation pp. 35-
46; Ward, British West Indian slavery pp. 38-60, 233-60; Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica pp. 16-33 
58 Eisner, Jamaica, 1830-1930, pp. 25-42, 358-60.  Eisner notes (p. 33) that she relied on the Blue 
Book submitted by the governor to the Colonial Office for 1831/2 for her figures for taxation and 
spending by the assembly, through the figures she provides do not match those in the Blue Book for 
that year: see TNA, CO 142/45 ff. 15r-20r.  Her figure for government spending in 1832 includes 
parish taxation, which is not included here because of the difficulty of projecting this back into the 
period before 1832. 
59 O’Brien, ‘Political economy’, p. 4. 
60 Emmet J. Larkin, The historical dimensions of Irish Catholicism (Dublin, 1997) pp. 43-6; T. W. 
Moody and W. E. Vaughan, Eighteenth-century Ireland, 1691-1800 (Oxford, 1986) pp. 185-6. 
61 Connolly, Divided kingdom pp. 432-84; McDowell, Ireland pp. 491-651.  Figures for taxation and 
expenditure taken from Duanaire: A Treasury of Digital Data for Irish Economic History, ‘Public 
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Ireland was therefore even more willing than their counterparts in Jamaica to vote 
exceptionally high taxes for their imperial garrison, to help underwrite their political 
and social order, though ultimately unsuccessfully, since they were eventually forced 
by the Irish Rebellion of 1798 to accept union with Britain in 1801.62   
 
-III- 
 
The fiscal and military state structures in Jamaica may not have measured up to their 
counterparts in Britain or Ireland in scale, but they were comparable in scope, and just 
as effective in serving the interests of the political and social elites who voted them.  
Fiscal and military structures reflected and supported the ‘creole society’ described by 
Brathwaite, Petley, Burnard and Diana Paton, and underwrote many of the costs of 
empire, though metropolitan officials rarely saw matters this way.  ‘At the same time 
that these taxes [for public defence] are looked upon so burthensome, the Assembly 
give away yearly in gratifications and donations to particular people … from £1,200 
to £1,500’, the governor noted in 1754, ‘… [and] add to this £12,500 more for the 
useless public buildings at Spanish Town and £8,000 for another ridiculous one at 
Bath, which can never be put to any service’.63  Yet such votes not only reduced the 
burden on the British Exchequer but also helped to entrench fiscal and administrative 
structures that could then be used, in wartime, to support imperial interests.  As in 
other colonial states, local elites therefore generally proved willing to put up with high 
taxes if it served their interests, suggesting that imperial state formation, in Jamaica 
and even elsewhere, was collaborative process between the metropole and periphery. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
revenues and expenditures of Ireland in the 18th century’ [http://www.duanaire.ie/finances18/, 
accessed 28 June 2016] 
62 Connolly, Divided kingdom pp. 484-93; McDowell, Ireland pp. 652-704 
63 TNA, CO 137/27 f. 24r 
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APPENDICES 
 
Figure 1: Revenues (J£), 1724-6464 
 
 
Figure 2: Revenues and Estimated Spending (J£), 1768-1839 (5 yr av.)65 
 
 
                                                 
64 TNA, CO 137/22 ff. 60v-62r; TNA, CO 137/27 ff. 18v-24r, 40v-52r; TNA, CO 137/34 ff. 38r-45v 
65 TNA, CO 140/46 pp. 166-7, 226-7, 335-7, 391-2, 439-40, 483-4, 547-9, 627-9, 700-2; TNA, CO 
140/59 pp. 61-3, 132-4, 221-5, 349-51, 448-50, 583-5, 625-9, 661-2; TNA, CO 140/69 pp. 79-82, 161-
7, 254-8, 359-61, 483-5, 544-6, 608; TNA, CO 140/75 pp. 228-31; TNA, CO 140/78 pp. 93-5, 197-8, 
276-9, 360-2, 521-3, 623, 636-9; TNA, CO 140/89 pp. 89-95, 287-91, 462-5, 577-80, 653-60; TNA, 
CO 140/91 pp. 77-83, 171-4, 283-6, 398-402, 545-50, 638-42; TNA, CO 140/96 pp. 94-7, 340-6, 409-
14, 488-92, 554-9, 674-8, 826-30; TNA, CO 140/103 pp. 13-22, 196-204; TNA, CO 140/104 pp. 150-
61, 178-88; TNA, CO 140/105 pp. 164-73; TNA, CO 140/106 pp. 182-91; TNA, CO 140/109 pp. 148-
52, 235-40, 372-8, 555-60, 731-7; TNA, CO 140/115 pp. 233-42; TNA, CO 140/116 pp. 224-35; TNA, 
CO 140/117 pp. 315-20; TNA, CO 140/119 pp. 113-21; TNA, CO 140/121 pp. 219-30; TNA, CO 
140/123 pp. 288-93; TNA, CO 140/125 pp. 323-32; TNA, CO 140/126 pp. 123-30; TNA, CO 140/128 
pp. 301-9 
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Table 1: Estimated Spending by category (J£), 1768-1838 
 
Dates Military66 Police67 Revenue68 Interest69 Loans70 Civil71 
Wartime72 55.8 7.0 3.3 4.5 3.8 26.2 
Peacetime73 45.5 7.4 5.7 3.3 8.9 29.2 
Emancipation74 11.9 21.3 12.1 6.9 6.9 40.8 
Total 48.0 8.3 5.0 4.1 6.3 28.6 
 
 
Table 2: Revenues by category (J£), 1789-1839 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Island pay, lodging money, baggage and wharfage, fuel, water, pioneers, boat hire, barracks and 
fortifications, commissioners of forts and fortifications, captains and lieutenants of forts, island 
engineer, island storekeeper, island barrackmaster, deputy barrackmasters, arms and ammunition, 
militia pay-bills, martial law. 
67 Island constabulary, prisons, regimental marshals, gaols, physicians to gaols, roads, maroon parties, 
superintendents of maroon towns. 
68 Receiver-general, deputy receivers-general, customs officers (from 1827), commissioners of stamps 
and staff, commissioners of accounts and secretary, clerks of vestries, collecting constables, rum 
collectors. 
69 On island certificates, Chancery Chest, Clergy Fund and other sums deposited. 
70 Repayment of Island Certificates. 
71 All sums not allocated to other columns. 
72 For financial years 1775/6 to 1782/3, 1791/2 to 1814/15, and 1831/2 
73 For financial years 1768/9 to 1774/5, 1783/4 to 1790/1, 1815/16 to 1830/1. 
74 For financial years 1832/3 to 1838/9 
75 Surplus of permanent revenue of £8,000 (£10,000 after 1795) under Revenue Act 1729 
76 Deficiency tax, poll tax and land tax 
77 Additional duties, foreign goods duties, taxes on imports and exports, tea duty, customs tonnage, 
cattle and horse duty, transient poors tax, stamp duty, tonnage duty, rum duty. 
78 Money received from arrears of taxes of past years. 
79 Fees and salaries, receipts from trustees of tolls, tax on public offices, savings banks, fees on private 
bills, chancery and school deposits, collecting constables’ cheques, sale of convicted slaves. 
80 From 1821 only. 
Dates Revenue75 Direct76 Indirect77 Arrears78 Misc.79 Loans Cheques80 
Wartime 4.9 44.3 26.8 15.4 1.7 7.0 0.0 
Peacetime 4.9 27.1 32.1 5.9 2.0 19.0 10.1 
Emancipation 4.4 11.6 48.2 6.1 6.7 6.1 6.3 
Total 4.8 33.1 31.9 10.5 2.5 12.9 4.3 
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Table 3: Taxation, per capita and as estimated percentage of gross domestic 
product (J£), 1754-1839 
 
Dates 
 
Taxation (av.)  
(J£)81 
Population82 
 
Tax/capita 
(J£) 
GDP (av)83 
(J£)84 
Tax/GDP 
(%) 
1754 £34,000 142,000 £0.24 £3.9 mil 0.9% 
1761 £75,000 161,000 £0.47 £3.9 mil 1.9% 
1768-1775 £42,000 224,000 £0.19 £4.8 mil 0.9% 
1775-1783 £120,000 224,000 £0.54 £4.8 mil 2.5% 
1782 £240,000 244,000 £0.98 £4.8 mil 5.0% 
1783-1791 £86,000 270,000 £0.44 £6.9 mil 1.7% 
1791-1794 £175,000 315,000 £0.56 £6.9 mil 2.5% 
1795-1802 £373,000 343,000 £1.09 £8.4 mil 4.4% 
1801 £463,000 378,000 £1.22 £8.4 mil 5.5% 
1801-1815 £300,000 392,000 £0.77 £9.9 mil 3.0% 
1815-1832 £240,000 376,000 £0.64 £8.5 mil 2.8% 
1832 £410,000 351,000 £1.17 £7.1 mil 5.8% 
1834-1839 £240,000 350,000 £0.69 £7.1 mil 3.4% 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Totals rounded to nearest thousand pounds currency. 
82 Rounded to the nearest thousand.  For 1754, 1761, 1774, see Pitman, West Indies p. 374.  For 1782, 
1784-91, see Lowell Ragatz, Statistics for the study of British Caribbean economic history, 1763-1833 
(London, 1927) p. 5 (average of 1778 and 1788).  For 1802, 1812, 1822, 1832 and 1834-9, see 
Drescher, Econocide pp. 255-6 (assuming a white and free coloured population of 40,000, and a 10 
percent under-reporting of slave population before 1817). 
83 See sources in main article. 
84 Totals rounded up to nearest £100,000. 
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Figure 3: Estimated Spending (J£), 1768-1839 
 
 
Figure 4: Revenues (J£), 1768-1839 
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